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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
The authors of this brief hold law degrees and
doctorate degrees in economics. They are law
professors who research and teach about intellectual
property law and its economic effects. They file this
brief solely as individuals and not on behalf of the
institutions with which they are affiliated. Amici
represent neither party in this action, and offer the
following views on this matter.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the
Progress of . . . the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .
Discoveries.” At the time of ratification, “useful Arts”
related to trades utilizing what we would today call
“technology.” Courts and the Patent Office long
recognized this limitation, denying patent protection
for business methods.

1

Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, amici note that no counsel
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund
the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than
amici curiae made a monetary contribution to its preparation or
submission. Petitioners and Respondents have consented to the
filing of this brief through blanket consent letters filed with the
Clerk’s Office.
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Beyond this constitutional limitation on the scope
of patentable subject matter, Congress has not
extended patent protection to business methods. The
subject matter provision of the 1952 Patent Act
merely codified existing subject matter categories and
limitations, including the exclusion of business
methods. The First Inventor Defense Act of 1999 did
not amend § 101. It merely created a prior user
defense. To read that provision to override more than
two centuries of jurisprudence as well as § 101 without an express statement to that effect would be
unwarranted and unwise.
Warnings that upholding the business method
exclusion would hamper innovation have little if any
bearing on the interpretation of the Constitution and
the Patent Act in this case. Regardless, economic
research indicates that restoring the business method
exclusion could well promote progress, innovation,
and competition.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

The Intellectual Property Clause of the
U.S. Constitution Precludes Congress
from Authorizing Patent Protection for
Business Methods and Other Subject
Matters Outside of the “useful Arts”

As a threshold matter, this case implicates the
scope of Congress’s constitutional power to enact
patent protection. This inquiry should be guided by
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3
the text of the Intellectual Property Clause and the
understanding of that text at the time of ratification.
This section demonstrates that the Constitution
limits patent monopolies to the “useful Arts,” a term
originally understood to exclude business methods.
Congress’s authority to enact patent protection
flows from the power “[t]o promote the Progress of . . .
the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . .
Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.” See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
2
5 (1966) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); 1
Ernest Bainbridge Lipscomb III, Walker on Patents
§ 2:1, at 70-87 (3d ed. 1984) (discussing scholarship
on interpretation of art. I, § 8, cl. 8). The original
understanding of the Intellectual Property Clause
demonstrates that protection for inventions was
limited to the “useful Arts,” while protection for
writings could extend to all general knowledge or
“Science.” See Lipscomb, supra § 2:1, at 71-73
(describing Pickney’s and Madison’s likely roles in
drafting the clause); The Federalist No. 43 (James
Madison) (“The copyright of authors has been
solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of
common law. The right to useful inventions seems
2

The omitted terms – “Science”, “Authors”, and “Writings”
– confer power to enact copyright protection. See Richard C. De
Wolf, An Outline of Copyright Law 15 (1925). During colonial
times, the word “science” connoted knowledge in any field.
Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed.
1785).
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with equal reason to belong to the inventors.”)
(emphasis added). The First Congress entitled the
initial patent act, “An Act to promote the progress of
useful Arts.” Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (emphasis
added). After the initial act, Congress passed fourteen
successive patent acts with titles directed to promoting “useful arts,” “useful discoveries,” or “useful
inventions.” See Lipscomb, supra § 2.1, at 83-84. Only
the Patent Act of 1837 referred to the promotion of
“science,” but that reference was corrected in the
Patent Act of 1839. Id. at 84. Thus, Congress’s patent
power was originally understood as limited to “useful
Arts.”
Because the Intellectual Property Clause constrains Congress’s authority to grant intellectual
property rights,3 Congress cannot grant patents
extending beyond the “useful arts.” See Graham, 383
U.S. at 5 (observing that the patent power is a
“qualified authority . . . [which] is limited to the
promotion of advances in the ‘useful arts’ ”). To determine the contours of this constraint on Congressional
patent power, the Court must consider the meaning of
the phrase at the time of ratification.

3

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (viewing the
“limited Times” language as a constraint on congressional power,
although not violated by the Copyright Term Extension Act);
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (holding that the
clause precludes granting exclusive rights absent “invention,”
“discovery,” or “originality”).
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Although the Framers provided no express
definition of the term “useful Arts,”4 usage at the time
indicates that “useful Arts” related to trades utilizing
what we would today call “technology.” Just days
before the Constitutional Convention of 1787, one
delegate gave examples of the “useful arts”:
Under all the disadvantages which have
attended manufactures and the useful arts,
it must afford the most comfortable reflection
to every patriotic mind to observe their
progress in the United States and particularly in Pennsylvania. . . . Permit me
however to mention them under their
general heads: meal of all kinds, ships and
boats, malt and distilled liquors, potash,
gunpowder, cordage, loaf-sugar, pasteboard,
cards and paper of every kind, books in
various languages, snuff, tobacco, starch,
cannon, musquets, anchors, nails, and very
many other articles of iron, bricks, tiles,
potters ware, millstones, and other stone
work, cabinet work, trunks and Windsor
chairs, carriages and harness of all kinds. . . .
Tench Coxe, An Address to an Assembly of the Friends
of American Manufactures, 17-18 (Philadelphia, R.
Aitkin & Son 1787). Alexander Hamilton praised the
patent system as a way of encouraging “[inventions]
4

See Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of
Patentability, 48 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 5, 10 (1966) (observing that
“[n]o historical writings or events have been found analyzing the
[Intellectual Property Clause])” .
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which relate to machinery” in the United States. See
Alexander Hamilton, The Reports of Alexander
Hamilton: Report on Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791) 11516, 175-76 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Harper & Row 1964);
see also The Federalist No. 8, at 69 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (distinguishing
between “the arts of industry, and the science of
finance”). These sources support the textual inference
that “useful Arts” concerned craft, trade, industrial,
and technological activities.
Historians and patent scholars concur that the
phrase “useful Arts”, as used and understood circa
1787, related to trades utilizing what we would today
call “technology.”5 The phrase “useful Arts” should be
understood in contradistinction to the 18th century
terms “polite,” “liberal,” and “fine” arts – which
related to aesthetic and philosophical pursuits.6 Just
5

See Seidel, supra note 4, at 10 (suggesting that “useful
Arts” in 1787 connoted useful or helpful trades); Robert I.
Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. Pat. Off.
Soc’y 487, 496 (1952) (noting that “[i]t seems clear that ‘useful
arts’ (as a unitary technical term) embraced the so-called
industrial, mechanical and manual arts of the 18th century”);
Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 32 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 83, 86
(1950) (explaining that “ ‘useful arts’ meant what we now call
‘technology,’ or ‘applied science’”).
6
See W. Kenrick, An Address to the Artists and
Manufacturers of Great Britain 21-38 (1774) (contrasting “useful
arts” with “polite arts”); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the
Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139, 1156-57 (1999);
Coulter, supra, at 494-96.
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as Congress could not confer original jurisdiction on
the Supreme Court for cases not specifically enumerated in Article III through statute, Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175-76 (1803), here Congress
may not authorize patents for “polite” or “liberal”
arts.
Furthermore, the model for early U.S. patent
law as well as the economic underpinnings of the
American Revolution reinforce that the Founders
conceived of patent protection as limited to technical
advances and not commercial systems. The English
Statute of Monopolies of 1623, which provided a
model for the U.S. patent system,7 provided an
exception to the general prohibition against monopolies by granting a “privilege for the term of fourteen
years or under [for] the sole working or making any
manner of new manufactures . . . to the . . . inventor. . . .” Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c.3
(Eng.). Notably, that Statute eliminated commercial
practices from the scope of patentable exclusivity:
[T]hose who formulated the Constitution
were familiar with the long struggle over
monopolies so prominent in English history,
where exclusive rights to engage even in
ordinary business activities were granted so
frequently by the Crown for the financial
7

See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 18 (1829) (observing
that “many of the provisions of our patent act are derived from
the principles and practice which have prevailed in the
construction of that of England”).
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benefits accruing to the Crown only. It was
desired that in this country any Government
grant of a monopoly for even a limited time
should be limited to those things which serve
in the promotion of science and the useful
arts.
In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (CCPA 1951).8
The first two centuries of federal patent protection reinforce that “useful Arts” was understood to
exclude business methods. The unpatentability of
business methods was well-settled within the Patent
Office by 1869. See Ex parte Abraham, 1869 C.D. 59
(“It is contrary to the spirit of the patent law
construed by the Office for years, to grant patents for
methods or analogous systems of bookkeeping.”).9 As
discussed in Part II, infra, courts and commentators
generally believed business methods to be outside the
scope of patent protection throughout this period.
8

See also Graham, 383 U.S. at 5 (observing that the “useful
arts” limitation on patentability in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
“was written against the backdrop of the [English] practices –
eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies – of the Crown
in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses
which had long before been enjoyed by the public”).
9
Cf. Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of
Business Method Patents, 28 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 61,
96 (2002) (“The absence of business method patents cannot be
explained by an absence of entrepreneurial creativity in Great
Britain during the century before the American Revolution. On
the contrary, 1720 is widely hailed as the beginning of a new era
in English public finance and the beginning of major innovations
in business organization.” (citing historical sources)).
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Applying plain meaning and the interpretive
canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the
express mention of one thing excludes all others), the
Constitutional phrase “useful Arts” most plausibly
precludes Congress from granting patents to business
methods, methods of practicing law, tax avoidance
strategies, plot scripts, sports moves, and other nontechnological subject matters. Such an interpretation
would not exclude patentability of technology to implement business methods or other non-technological
arts.
II.

Neither the 1952 Patent Act Nor the First
Inventor Defense Act of 1999 Extended
the Scope of Patent Protection to
Business Methods

If the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to
bring non-technological “discoveries” within the scope
of patent protection, then this Court must interpret
the scope of § 101 of the Patent Act. The historical
record, statutory language, and legislative history
relating to the 1952 Patent Act demonstrate that it
did not encompass business methods.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1482022

10
A. The 1952 Patent Act Perpetuated
Traditional Limitations on Patentable
Subject Matter, Including the Exclusion
of Business Methods
1. Historical Context of the 1952 Patent
Act
The legislation that ultimately became the
Patent Act of 1952 began as part of a general
codification of the laws of the United States. See H.R.
Rep. No. 82-1923, at 1 (1952) (“For many years there
had been considerable agitation for a complete
restatement and codification of all the laws of the
United States, inasmuch as the only such codification
– the Revised Statutes of 1874 – had become
generally outmoded on all subjects.”). The impetus for
the Patent Act of 1952 was to bring together the
numerous sections of the patent law – dating to the
Revised Statutes of 1874 and subsequent enactments
– into Title 35 of the United States Code. Id. at 5.
The codification task was assigned to the
Committee on the Judiciary, which concurrently
oversaw substantive revision of the patent law. Id. at
2. The Committee held hearings and called upon P.J.
Federico, Examiner-in-Chief of the U.S. Patent Office,
as well as other government officers, representatives
of patent law associations, and members of the Bar.
The House Report characterized codification as
the “principal purpose” of the bill. Id. at 5. But the
bill also made several substantive changes to the
patent law, principally out of concern that Supreme
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Court decisions raised the threshold for inventiveness
too high and applied the doctrine of patent misuse too
liberally. The House Report noted two “major” substantive changes to the substantive patent law:
“incorporating a requirement for invention in § 103
and the judicial doctrine of contributory infringement
in § 271.” Id.
2. The Origins and Meaning of Section 101 of the 1952 Patent Act
The nation’s first patent law, “An Act to promote
the progress of useful arts” (1790), defined the scope
of patentable subject matter as “any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any
improvement therein not before known or used.” Ch.
7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790). Congress replaced the
1790 Act three years later with another “act to
promote the progress of useful arts.”
The Patent Act of 1793 defined the scope of
patentable subject matter as:
any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter and any
new and useful improvement on any art,
machine, manufacture or composition of
matter.
Act of February 21, 1793, 1 Stat. 318. That language
remained until the recodification of patent law in the
1952 Act. Congress preserved the language nearly
verbatim. In the 1952 Act, Section 101 provides:
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any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof may obtain
a patent therefore, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.
Act July 19, 1952, c. 950, 66 Stat. 792, codified at 35
U.S.C. § 101. The only differences between the
sections are the substitution of the word “process” for
“art” and the avoidance of repeating the categories
following the improvement clause through the use of
the term “thereof.” The legislative history makes
clear that substituting “process” for “art” was not
intended to be substantive in nature but rather to
avoid confusion with other uses of the word “art”:
“Art” in this place in the [prior] statute has a
different meaning than the words “useful
arts” in the Constitution, and a different
meaning than the use of the word “art” in
other places in the statutes, and it is
interpreted by the courts to be practically
synonymous with process or method. The
word “process” has been used to avoid the
necessity of explanation that the word “art”
as used in this place means “process or
method,” and that it does not mean the same
thing as the word “art” in other places.
H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6.
To further clarify this substitution, Congress
added the following definition:
(b) the term “process” means process, art or
method, and includes a new use of a known
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process, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material.
35 U.S.C. § 100. The legislative history reinforces
that Congress did not intend to change the substantive scope of patentable subject matter:
The definition of “process” has been added in
section 100 to make it clear that “process or
method” is meant, and also to clarify the
present law as to the patentability of certain
types of processes or methods as to which
some insubstantial doubts have been expressed.
H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6. The latter clause –
“certain types of processes or methods as to which
some insubstantial doubts have been expressed” –
was intended to clarify that dicta in In re Thuau, 135
F.2d 344, 347 (CCPA 1943) and some other decisions
should not be read to bar patentability of a new use of
a known machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter. See P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. (1954), reprinted in 75 J. Pat.
& Trademark Off. Soc’y 161 (1993) [hereinafter
“Federico Commentary”].
Thus, the language and legislative history show
that Congress intended in the 1952 Act to clarify and
recodify the existing contours of patentable subject
matter. Congress did not intend to effectuate any
change in the scope of patentable subject matter
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(other than the caveat regarding new uses). See
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981)
(“Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent
protection for a ‘process’ did not change with the
addition of that term to § 101.”). Rather, it perpetuated the existing contours of patentable subject
matter as expressed in the statute and recognized in
patent jurisprudence. The substitution of “process”
for “art” was for linguistic clarity – to avoid confusion
with the constitutional phrase “useful Arts” and the
concept of “prior art” – and not substantive reasons.
This contrasts with the legislative language and
intent with regard to §§ 103 and 271, which were
substantive in nature. See Federico Commentary,
supra, (“some modification was intended in the
direction of moderating the extreme degrees of
strictness exhibited by a number of judicial opinions
over the past dozen or more years”). Thus, to
interpret the scope of patentable subject matter
under the 1952 Act, the Court must delve into the
contemporary understanding of the terms in § 101
that would have been available to the members of the
legislative body at the time of enactment.
3. As of 1952, Judicial Decisions
Considered Business Methods to Be
Beyond the Scope of Patentable
Subject Matter
The most authoritative sources that Congress
would have consulted at the time of enacting the 1952
Patent Act – treatises and judicial decisions – agreed
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that business methods were outside the scope of
patentable subject matter. As of 1952, the most
authoritative patent treatise was Anthony William
Deller’s four volume treatise, entitled Walker on
Patents: Deller Edition, published in 1937. The Deller
edition updated Albert Henry Walker’s classic patent
treatise, first published in 1883.
Section 18 of the Deller Edition of Walker on
Patents, entitled “Unpatentable Subjects” states:
In view of the fact that patents are grants
authorized by statute, only those classes of
inventions which are specified by the patent
statutes [ ] can be given patent protection.
The statutes particularly specify “any new
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvements thereof,”. . . . It is erroneous to
believe that every new idea or principle in
and by itself is patentable. Thus, a so-called
law of nature or scientific principle may not
be the subject of a patent. Within the
classification of unpatentable subjects also
fall, the function, result or effect of a
machine, an abstract idea, mental theories,
plans of action, and so-called “systems” of
business. These subjects will be discussed in
more detail in the following sections.
William Anthony Deller, Walker on Patents: Deller’s
Edition, vol. 1, p. 62 (1937) [hereinafter Deller’s 1937
Edition] (emphasis added). This makes clear several
critical features of patentable subject matter in the
years leading up to 1952: (1) only inventions falling
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within the designated categories of “art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter” could be
patented; (2) “not every new idea or principle in and
by itself is patentable”; and (3) courts recognized
several categories of unpatentable subject matter –
laws of nature or scientific principles; function, result
or effect of a machine; abstract ideas; mental
theories; plans of action; and systems of business.
Section 22 of the treatise, entitled “Systems of
Business,” states:
As instances of non-patentability of
ideas,[10] mention may be made of the various
systems for doing business, each as modes of
bookkeeping, and hotel checking systems. It
has been held that a “system” or method of
transaction business in neither as “art,” nor
does it come within any other designation of
patentable subject-matter, as for example, a
system of cash-registering and checking for
hotels apart from the physical means of
conducting the system. [Munson v. Mayor,
etc., of New York, 124 U. S. 601, 31 L. Ed. 586
(1888); United States Credit System Co. v.
American Credit System Co., 51 Fed. 751,
754, C. C., N. D. Ill. (1892); United States
10

[Section 22 references the prior section (“Abstract Ideas”),
which states “[a]n idea itself, the mere existence of an
intellectual notion that a thing could be done, and, if done,
might be of practical utility, and mere mental theories or plans
of action are not comprehended within the subject matter of
patents.”]
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Credit System Co. v. American Credit
Indemnity Co., 53 Fed. 818; Hocke v. N. Y.
Central & H. R. R. Co., 122 Fed. 467, 469, C.
C. A. 2 (1903); cert. den. 191 U.S. 569, 48
L. Ed. 306; Hotel Security Checking Co. v.
Lorraine Co., 160 Fed. 467, 469, 479, and
cases cited, C. C. A. 2 (1908); Berardini v.
Tocci, 190 Fed. 329, 333 (1911); aff ’d 200
Fed. 1021, C. C. A. 2 (1912); Guthrie v.
Curlett, 10 F.(2d) 725, 726, C. C. A. 2 (1926).]
As to whether or not the means of carrying
out the system are patentable, there seems
to be no objection in principle or authority.
[Rand McNally & Co. v. Exchange ScripBook Co., 187 Fed. 984, 986, C. C. A. 7
(1911); Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210
Fed. 443, 446, C. C. A. 6 (1913).]
Deller’s 1937 Edition, vol. 1, at 69.
The unpatentability of business methods was
also well-settled within the Patent Office and courts
as early as 1869. See Ex parte Abraham, 1869 C.D.
59. Court decisions from 1893 through the 1952 Act
repeatedly declare that methods of doing business
were not patentable subject matter. The current
author of Walker on Patents observes that “[u]ntil
recently it had been considered well established that
[business] methods were non-statutory.” Moy’s Walker
on Patents § 5:28 (4th ed. 2008) (emphasis added).
Moy further reports that:
Virtually all the prior reference works that
mention business methods note that they
were not patentable subject matter. See, e.g.,
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Leon H. Amdur, Patent Law and Practice 2425 (1935); Anthony William Deller, 1 Walker
on Patents 152-53 (1938 ed.); Robert L.
Harmon, Patents and the Federal Circuit 41
(3rd ed. 1994). Until only recently the
USPTO’s own Manual of Patenting Examination Procedure also asserted that business
methods were unpatentable.
Moy’s Walker on Patents § 5:28 n.2 (4th ed. 2008)
(citation omitted).
The long-standing interpretive canon presuming
that codification statutes do not alter prior law
applies directly here. Because business methods were
outside of the scope of patentable subject matter prior
to the 1952 Act and Congress intended to perpetuate
existing contours of patentable subject matter when it
passed the 1952 Act, the inescapable conclusion is
that the 1952 Act excluded business methods from
the scope of patentable subject matter. This Court
stated in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989),
superceded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, that,
“[u]nder established canons of statutory construction,
‘it will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and
consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect
unless such intention is clearly expressed.’ ” Id. at 554
(quoting Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S.
187, 199 (1912) (holding that linguistic changes in the
1948 revision of the Judicial Code did not expand the
substantive scope of jurisdiction) (emphasis added)).
Congress did not clearly express its intent to change
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the scope of patentable subject matter – in fact, it
clearly expressed the opposite – so this Court should
find no change in the scope of patentable subject
matter of § 101. Cf. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (“[W]here a
common-law principle is well established . . . the
courts may take it as given that Congress has
legislated with an expectation that the principle will
apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S.
779, 783 (1952) (“Statutes which invade the common
law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring
the retention of long-established and familiar
principles, except when a statutory purpose to the
contrary is evident.”).
B. The Phrase “Anything Under the Sun
Made by Man” from the 1952 Act’s
Legislative History Does Not Indicate
Legislative Intent to Expand the Scope
of Patentable Subject Matter
Some of the confusion surrounding the patentability of business methods stems from a snippet
(“anything under the sun made by man”) from the
legislative history of the 1952 Act. That phrase first
surfaced in Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961
(CCPA 1979). It was then picked up in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) and Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) without its full
context or even ellipses. It was then mischaracterized
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in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.
Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1093 (1999), to suggest that Congress
intended to cover business method patents in the
1952 Act. Analysis of this snippet in context shows
that it does not and cannot mean what the State
Street court concluded.
The snippet in question arises in the section of
the House Report describing “Part II” of Title 35,
which “relates to patentability of inventions and the
grant of patents.” H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6. This
discussion begins with four paragraphs explaining
§ 101: the first two deal with the subject matter
categories; the second two focus on the final clause of
§ 101.
The first and longest paragraph begins by stating
that § 101 “specifies the type of material that can be
the subject matter of a patent.” This clearly implies
that there are types of material that are not within
the scope of patentable subject matter. The report
then explains that the 1952 Act covers the same
subject matter categories as prior law, with the
semantic change of “art” to “process.” See id.
The second paragraph explains that the definition of “process” was added in § 100 “to make it
clear that ‘process or method’ is meant, and also to
clarify the present law as to the patentability of
certain types of processes or methods as to which
some insubstantial doubts have been expressed.” See
id. This clearly refers to the overruling of dicta in

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1482022

21
In re Thuau, 135 F.2d 344 (CCPA 1943). See Part
II(A)(2), supra.
The third paragraph states in its entirety:
Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that
can be patented, “subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.” The
conditions under which a patent may be
obtained follow, and section 102 covers the
conditions relating to novelty.
H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6. At this point in the
discussion, the report has moved past the subject
matter categories of § 101 to the final clause – it is a
transition to the additional (non-subject matter)
requirements for patentability.
The fourth and final paragraph, which includes
the snippet in question, then states in its entirety:
A person may have “invented” a machine or a
manufacture, which may include anything
under the sun that is made by man, but it is
not necessarily patentable under section 101
unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.
H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6. Given the order of
paragraphs as well as the transition, this sentence
augments and reinforces the preceding paragraph –
which is focused on the final clause of § 101: noting
that the test of patentability includes novelty and
other requirements. Furthermore, the prefatory
clause clearly limits the dependent clause (“which
may include anything under the sun that is made by
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man”) to the statutory classes of “machine” or “manufacture.” These categories plainly fall within the
ambit of “useful Arts.” Note that the prefatory clause
does not include the other statutory categories:
“process” and “composition of matter.” Nor does this
sentence call for maximal subject matter. Rather, it
emphasizes the importance of meeting additional
requirements for patentability.
Thus, read in context, the “anything under the
sun” snippet does not stand for the proposition that
Congress intended the broadest possible scope of
patentable subject matter. Furthermore, it cannot
properly be the basis for finding that Congress
intended to override long-standing limitations on the
scope of patentable subject matter – such as the
exclusion of business method patents – reflected in
jurisprudence and practice. See Finley, 490 U.S. at
554; cf. Solimino, 501 U.S. at 108; Isbrandtsen, 343
U.S. at 783.
C. The First Inventor Defense Act of 1999
Did Not Expand the Scope of Patentable Subject Matter
Several briefs contend that the First Inventor
Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. A, 113
Stat. 1501, 552, 555, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273,
indicates congressional intent to afford patent protection for business methods. These arguments overlook the statutory text, legislative history, and
circumstances leading to the establishment of the
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§ 273 prior user right, which demonstrate that
Congress’s intent was far less ambitious.
First and foremost, the text of the statute demonstrates that Congress did not expand the scope of
patentable subject matter. The 1999 legislation does
not amend § 101, which governs the scope of
patentable subject matter. Arguments that the 1999
Amendment overturned the established definition of
“process,” in essence, require that the amendment
repealed the limited scope of § 101 of the 1952 Act by
implication. Such interpretations violate the “cardinal rule that repeals by implication are not favored.”
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974); see also
Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003); Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)
(Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of
a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions – it does not, one might say, hide elephants
in mouseholes.”); Posadas v. National City Bank, 296
U.S. 497, 503 (1936). If the adoption of § 273
dramatically expanded the scope of § 101, it did so
without Congress expressly acknowledging that
effect, and thus would require this Court to endorse
an implied repeal of the settled interpretation of
§ 101 of the 1952 Patent Act.
Instead, Congress placed § 273 in Part III of Title
35, which addresses enforcement rights. That choice
is significant because when Congress originally
compiled and codified patent law in the 1952 Patent
Act it established a three-part structure intended to
guide future developments: “[t]he organization of the
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bill and the arrangement of the sections are such that
new future amendments can readily find their place
in the organization.”11 H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 5
(1952). Congress described the differences between
sections in detail to aid this organization: “The second
part consists of the sections relating to the conditions
under which a patent may be obtained. . . . The third
part contains the sections relating to the patents
themselves and the protections of rights under
patents.” Id. The placement of the First Inventor
Defense Act of 1999 in Part III instead of Part II
indicates Congress’s intent not to change the law
governing “the conditions under which a patent may
be obtained.” Id. This Court has warned against
adopting statutory interpretations that are inconsistent with the structure of the overall statutory
scheme. See Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96,
108 (2007). Interpreting § 273 as a revision to “the
conditions under which a patent may be obtained,”
H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 5, directly contradicts
Congress’s established statutory structure of Title 35.
That § 273 is a stand-alone provision, intended
simply to provide a limited defense in the event that
business methods were deemed patentable, is further
demonstrated by the text of § 273. In defining the
term “method” for purposes of the prior user defense,
11

Title 35 now also includes a Part IV entitled “Patent
Cooperation Treaty” relating to the harmonization of U.S. patent
law with international treaty obligations. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 35176.
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Congress avoided altering the definitions governing
patentable subject matter in § 100. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(a) (providing definitions of terms “[w]hen used
in this title”). Instead, Congress included a definition
of “method” in § 273(a), “[f]or purposes of this
section,” which deals only with the limited defense.
Id. (emphasis added). Had Congress intended to
endorse the State Street definition of “method,” it
could easily have applied that definition to the entire
title, including § 101.
The legislative history also does not support the
contention that Congress intended to amend § 100 or
§ 101 by the backdoor method of adopting a standalone defense in Part III. Any fair reading of the
legislative history reveals ambiguity, but nothing
amounts to an express endorsement of State Street.
At best, the legislative history acknowledges that a
court interpreted § 101 in a particular way, H.R. Rep.
No. 82-1923 at 47 (observing that “[t]he State Street
court came down on the side of a very broad scope of
subject matter that qualifies for protection”), and as a
result, enactment of a defense is necessary given that
business methods until then were not considered
patentable. Id. at 46 (observing that State Street
provided protection “for subject matter that previously had been thought to be unpatentable.”). Had
Congress understood State Street as the correct interpretation of what Congress intended in the 1952 Act,
it easily could have said that. The better interpretation of the opaque discussion is that Congress
was fixing an urgent problem created by a surprising
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decision. The speed with which Congress enacted the
fix – the final bill and report were completed in fewer
than seven months and the bill was enacted in fewer
than eleven months from the denial of certiorari to
the Act – further supports that Congress addressed a
potentially serious problem without taking on the
bigger issue. And while Congress could have overruled State Street, that would have required much
more extensive reports, hearings, and stakeholder
involvement. The § 273 defense was a path of low, if
not least, resistance.
The circumstances surrounding the enactment of
a prior user right shows that Congress sought to
avoid adverse consequences of the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of patentable subject matter in State
Street, supra, not to expand the scope of patentable
subject matter or ratify the State Street decision. The
State Street decision boldly swept away more than a
century of jurisprudence holding that business
methods were unpatentable and ignored the language
and legislative history of the 1952 Act.12 The decision
12

Judge Giles Rich based his broad reading of Section 101
of the 1952 Patent Act in State Street on two fundamental
misapprehensions: (1) that the use of the word “any” takes
precedence over the designation of specific subject matter
categories; and (2) that Congress’s use of the phrase “anything
under the sun that is made by man” in the legislative history
could be taken out of its proper context to eviscerate established
jurisprudential limitations on patentable subject matter.
According to the State Street decision, the only limitation on the
scope of patentable subject matter is that an invention produce a
“useful, concrete, and tangible result.” See State Street, 149 F.3d
(Continued on following page)
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sent ominous shock waves through the business and
financial communities. See, e.g., William T. Ellis &
Aaron Chatterjee, “State Street” Sets Seismic
Precedent, Nat’l L.J., Sept. 21, 1998, at B13; “Boom”
in Business Method Patent Filings Has Followed
State Street Ruling, PTO Says, Pat. Trademark &
Copr. J. (BNA) 115 (Dec. 10, 1998); Josh McHugh,
Barbed Wire on the Internet, Forbes, May 17, 1999, at
183 (suggesting that e-commerce magnates may “try
to turn patents into the barbed wire of the Internet”);
at 1375 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir.
1994)). Interestingly, Judge Rich took the opposite view three
decades earlier, when his recollection of the 1952 Act would
undoubtedly have been fresher:
Section 101, entitled ‘Inventions patentable,’
enumerated the categories of inventions subject to
patenting. Of course, not every kind of an invention
can be patented. Invaluable though it may be to
individuals, the public, and national defense, the
invention of a more effective organization of the
materials in, and the techniques of teaching a course
in physics, chemistry, or Russian is not patentable
because it is outside of the enumerated categories of
‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.’
Also outside that group is one of the greatest
inventions of our times, the diaper service.
Giles S. Rich, The Principles of Patentability, 28 George
Washington Univ. L. Rev. 393, 393-94 (1960). Under the test
articulated in the State Street Bank decision – does the
invention produce a “useful, concrete, and tangible result” – it is
difficult to see how the first diaper service would not pass
muster. Yet, Judge Rich considered it outside of the scope of
§ 101 in 1960. Congress made no changes to the scope of
patentable subject matter in the intervening years.
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Jaret Seidberg, Ruling Threatens Banks With Patent
Lawsuits, Am. Banker, Sept. 2, 1998, at 3 (asserting
that the State Street decision “threatens to embroil
the financial services industry in hundreds of patent
infringement lawsuits,” creating possible liability
exceeding $2 billion); Robert M. Kunstadt, Opening
Pandora’s Box, IP Mag., Jan. 1999 (warning that “a
firestorm of litigation threatens to engulf corporate
America” and predicting “large-scale disruption of
U.S. commerce, as sharp operators move to patent
business methods and assert patents against the
unsuspecting”).
In this atmosphere of harsh criticism of the State
Street decision and dire predictions about its impacts
on the financial sector, Congress’s decision to create a
safe harbor is most plausibly interpreted as sidestepping the question of patentable subject matter.
Congress sought to insulate businesses that were
using methods as trade secrets from the State Street
decision, leaving the scope of § 101 intact. Furthermore, for opponents of business method patents,
enacting a business method patent exclusion into law
was not necessary in light of the text of § 101 (which
limits subject matter to designated categories),
Supreme Court jurisprudence, and the legislative
history surrounding the 1952 Act. On the other side,
some patent holders and members of the patent bar
were resistant to Congress tinkering with the core
subject matter provision.
By placing the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999
in Part III of Title 35, Congress avoided the
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patentability debate and confined its amendment to
the enforceability of patent rights. For the reasons set
forth in Parts I and II(A), supra, the 1999 Amendment was passed in response to the judicial error in
State Street. This Court should not “place on the
shoulders of Congress the burden of the Court’s own
error.” Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70
(1946) (holding that the passage of the Second War
Powers Act of 1942 did not constitute Congressional
acquiescence to previous decisions incorrectly construing the War Powers Act of 1940). To read that
provision to override more than two centuries of
jurisprudence as well as § 101 without an express
statement to that effect would be unwarranted and
unwise.
III. Economic Research Cautions Against
Extending Patent Protection to Business
Methods
Several briefs suggest, without substantiation,
that a categorical exclusion of business method
patents or some limits on the patentability of computer software would greatly impair innovation and
economic activity.13 The relevance of this argument to
13

See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of 20 Law and Business
Professors, 18 (“Expanding these categorical denials of
patentability beyond this well-established core of exceptions
would work a harm of unpredictable magnitude on the
incentives to innovate in the United States.”); Brief for the
Business Software Association as Amicus Curiae, 7 (“Simple
economics suggests that, if patent protection for software were
(Continued on following page)
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constitutional or statutory interpretation in this case
is attenuated at best. Nonetheless, we believe that it
is important to provide the Court with a more
balanced account of the economic effects of extending
patent protection to business methods.
Economic research has shown that the relationship between patent protection and innovation is
complex and often diverges from the naive and
romantic incentive story being asserted in several
briefs supporting the patentability of nontechnological arts. See generally Peter S. Menell &
Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in
Handbook of Law and Economics 1479-1524 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds. 2007).
Patent-based incentives are crucial for promoting
invention in industries, such as pharmaceuticals,
where prospective inventors face high expected
research costs and rapid imitation. See Joseph A.
DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski,
The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. Health Econ. 151 (2003)
(estimating that the average cost to develop a new
drug, including the costs of research projects that
were abandoned, is $402 million). Absent patents
(and regulatory hurdles), generic drug companies
could quickly imitate a successful new drug at a small
fraction of this development cost.

curtailed, the adverse consequences would be swift and
severe. . . . software development would suffer.”).
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But the pharmaceutical industry is not typical.
First, few other industries have such a high regulatory burden on initial innovation. Second, imitation
is more difficult in most industries. Edwin Mansfield,
Mark Schwartz & Samuel Wagner, Imitation Costs
and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 Econ. J. 907
(1981), using survey data, find that imitation cost and
imitation time are about two-thirds of the original
development cost and time on average. Third, pharmaceutical inventions tend to be discrete and pharmaceutical patents tend to feature clear boundaries
that make enforcement effective. See James Bessen &
Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges,
Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk
107, 153 (2008). The social value of patents tends to
be lower in fields, including business method
innovations, characterized by cumulative innovation
and fuzzy patent boundaries. See Federal Trade
Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper
Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy
(2003).
Economic evidence indicates that the social costs
of business method patents are significant and the
social benefits are small compared to those costs.
A. The Social Costs of Business Methods
Are Significant
Patent grants entail significant social costs –
including impeding follow-on research and competition – and hence the net impact on innovation can be
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complex and ambiguous. When inventors work on
different but complementary research lines, they each
can benefit from unconstrained access to the inventions of others. “[W]hen innovation is sequential and
complementary, standard conclusions about patents
and imitation may get turned on their heads.
Imitation becomes a spur to innovation, whereas
strong patents become an impediment.” James
Bessen & Eric S. Maskin, Sequential Innovation,
Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND J. Econ. 611, 613
(2009).
The effects of patents on cumulative innovation
depend critically on the transaction costs relating to
licensing. See Menell and Scotchmer, supra, at 14991506. Such costs can be particularly high in areas –
such as business method patents – where claim scope
is vague due to notice problems and attendant
litigation uncertainty. See Bessen & Meurer, supra, at
46-72. Innovators have difficulty clearing rights
before making investments or taking steps to avoid
infringement. This results in enormous cost from
opportunistic lawsuits. Furthermore, patent examiners and courts have difficulty evaluating patents
with fuzzy boundaries.
Empirical evidence reveals both negative and
positive effects of patents on the pace of cumulative
innovation. A high concentration of software patents
in a particular market discourages entry, especially
when patent rights are ambiguous and transaction
costs are likely to be high. See Iain M. Cockburn &
Megan MacGarvie, Entry, Exit and Patenting in the

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1482022

33
Software Industry, NBER Working Paper No. 12563
(2006). This deterrent effect is strongest for small,
new firms. Id. Furthermore, a high concentration of
patents delays venture capital funding for new software firms. Iain M. Cockburn & Megan MacGarvie,
Patents, Thickets and the Financing of Early-Stage
Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry, 18 J.
Econ. & Manag. Strategy 729 (2009). On the positive
side, an entrant’s own patents may facilitate
financing and entry into markets subject to a high
concentration of others’ patents. Id.
Consider a business method patent recently
asserted against Google, AOL, Microsoft, Yahoo! and
others. Performance Pricing, Inc. v. Google, Inc., Civil
Action No. 2-07cv432, 2009 WL 2497102 (E.D. Tex.,
August 13, 2009). The patent covers a method of
“conducting business transactions over the Internet,
allowing buyers to reduce the price of the selected
product/service based on the buyer’s performance
during a collateral activity.” Id. at *1. The number
and size of the defendants in this lawsuit illustrates
the broad potential reach and potential liability
exposure of such patents. It appears that the patent
has failed as property in one of two ways. Either
major Internet firms brazenly pirated patented
technology from a small inventor, or they
independently created technology and were not able
to avoid subsequent patent litigation.
The patent asserted in Performance Pricing
contains broad and vague language that might be
read to cover Internet ad auctions or other activities
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by the defendants. Even though the patent discloses
nothing about Internet ad auctions, the defendants
still must be wary. Microsoft, Yahoo! and others have
settled with the patent owner. See Samuel Howard,
Microsoft Exits Dispute Over Online Ad Patent,
Law360, June 2, 2009, http://www.law360.com/articles/
109339. Given the potentially devastating stakes,
high cost of discovery and mounting a defense,
business disruption of litigation, adverse publicity
from being sued, and uncertainty over the outcome,
many defendants license patents or settle lawsuits
even when they stand a good chance of prevailing. See
Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and
Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44
B. C. L. Rev. 509 (2003); Joseph Farrell & Carl
Shapiro, How Strong are Weak Patents?, 98 Amer.
Econ. Rev. 1347 (2008). These costs discourage and
distort innovation.
There is little that businesses can do to insure
against this risk. Firms in the information, communications, and finance industries find that rights
clearance is usually impractical because patent
boundaries are too hard to decipher and the number
of potentially relevant patents is too great. See
Bessen & Meurer, supra, at 70 (“According to David
M. Martin, CEO of a patent risk-management firm, ‘if
you’re selling online, at the most recent count there
are 4,319 patents you could be violating. If you also
planned to advertise, receive payments for or plan
shipments of your goods, you would need to be
concerned with approximately 11,000.’ ”); Mark A.
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Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 19,
21.14 Behavior is radically different in industries
where patent boundaries are relatively clear, enabling patents to function like tangible forms of property. Pharmaceutical firms read patents and work
hard to license necessary patent rights before investing in drug development. See Benjamin N. Roin,
Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of
Patentability, 87 Texas L. Rev. 503, 545-47 (2009).
Evidence from patent litigation further illustrates the high costs of business method patents.
Such patents are about seven times more likely to be
asserted in a lawsuit than the average patent. See
Bessen & Meurer, supra at 153. They are also about
seven times more likely to have their claim construction appealed to the Federal Circuit. Id. The rate
of litigation for finance-related patents is twenty
seven to thirty nine times greater than the average
patent. See Josh Lerner, The Litigation of Financial
Patents, Harv. Bus. School Working Paper 09-027, 2
(2008).

14

Copying by the defendant in patent cases is relatively
rare: less than four percent of the cases tried to judgment (and
probably less that two percent of the relevant cases). See Bessen
& Meurer, supra, at 126; Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A.
Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1421 (2009). In
the overwhelming majority of business method enforcement
actions, the defendants implemented the allegedly infringing
business methods without knowledge of the patent owner’s
“invention” or the patent.
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B. The Social Benefits of Business
Methods Are Small Compared to the
Social Costs
Economic research casts doubt on whether the
social benefits of business method patents outweigh
the social costs. In theory, such patents promote
innovation by attracting capital for the creation of
new business methods and encouraging disclosure of
methods that would otherwise be kept secret. “There
is at present very little evidence to argue that
business method patents have had a significant effect
on the R&D investments of financial institutions.”
Robert M. Hunt, Business Method Patents and U.S.
Financial Services, Working Paper No. 08-10,
Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, 27, January
2009. Business and financial methods are more likely
to fall into the class of inventions for which the costs
of patenting outweigh the benefits due to the impediments to cumulative innovation and the drag of
prosecution costs, due diligence, and litigation. See
Bronwyn Hall, Business and Financial Method
Patents, Innovation, and Policy, NBER Working
Paper No. 14868, 18 (2009).
Business method innovation will continue in the
absence of patent protection because there are many
other means for appropriating rewards from this type
of innovation. Staying ahead of competitors is the
most basic and most important incentive. See generally Phillipe Aghion, et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 120 Q. J. Econ. 701
(2005); Bessen & Maskin, supra. “Panelists [at
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hearings held by the FTC] consistently stated that
competition drives innovation in [software and
internet] industries.” See Federal Trade Commission,
supra at Ch. 3, p. 44. In addition to lead-time, the
sale of complementary goods and services, reputation,
tax incentives, research contracts, government
grants, trademark protection, and copyright protection play significant roles in supporting innovation.
Cf. Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns
from Industrial R&D, 3 Brookings Papers on Econ.
Activity 783 (1987); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R.
Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not), NBER
Working Paper No. 7552 (2000).
Although these surveys do not address business
method innovation directly, their results for software
are relevant because many business method patents
have software implementations. See Hunt, supra at 1.
A recent survey of small, new firms confirms the
results in the early surveys which focused mostly on
larger firms. “In software, patenting is rated the least
important among all the appropriability strategies.”
See Stuart J.H. Graham, et al., High Technology
Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the
2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 28, August 25, 2009,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1429049. Empirical studies indicate that software
patents have not stimulated software research. Even
though the number of software patents has grown
dramatically, there is no associated evidence of
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growth in software research and development. See
James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look
at Software Patents, 16 J. Econ. & Manag. Strategy
157 (2007).
Some commentators argue that business method
patents induce firms to disclose inventions that would
otherwise be kept secret. There is little evidence that
this putative benefit is significant (or even exists).
Survey evidence suggests that few innovators read
patents for their disclosures because the quality of the
disclosure is low. See Bessen & Meurer, supra, at 233.
Regardless of disclosure quality, the incentive to patent
is undercut by the failure of most countries to permit
patents on business methods. There is a strong
incentive to maintain secrecy because American patents
are of limited value in global financial markets.
In summary, to paraphrase Mark Twain, warnings of “harm of unpredictable magnitude on the
incentives to innovate” and “swift and severe” “adverse consequences” from the exclusion of business
method patents have been greatly exaggerated. To
the contrary, economic research indicates that
restoring this well-established limitation on the scope
of patentable subject matter could well promote
progress, innovation, and competition. Although we
doubt that these considerations bear significantly if
at all on the interpretive questions before the Court,
they should certainly not be weighed on the side of
extending patent protection to business methods.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution bars Congress from extending patent protection to non-technological fields, including business
methods. Even if constitutional authority exists, Congress perpetuated the well-established business method
exclusion in the 1952 Patent Act and the First
Inventor Defense Act of 1999 should not be read to
override § 101.
The courts and the Patent Office successfully
navigated the line between technological and nontechnological fields for over two centuries. Patent
systems throughout the world continue to do so. Reestablishing technological advance as the touchstone
for patent protection in the United States will help to
restore confidence in, the efficacy of, and the logic of
this vital institution.
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